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IN DEFENSE OF A YOUTH
Gregory L. Curtis
INTRODUCTION
The task of representing a youth in juvenile court is a difficult
one. Juvenile proceedings have until recently been regarded as civil
rather than criminal,' but the infusion of criminal procedural pro-
tections into this civil structure during the past decade make these
proceedings unique within the legal system. In order to represent a
child effectively, it is essential that counsel understand the law, the
proceedings, and the corresponding responsibilities within the youth
court system. This comment describes the various stages in the
youth court from the time the child is brought into custody through
preliminary procedures, adjudication, disposition, probation viola-
tion and revocation, and possible transfer into adult court. This
discussion is intended to function as a survey of the task of juvenile
representation.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
On July 1, 1974, the Montana Youth Court Act (hereinafter
referred to as the Youth Court Act) became effective.' Under earlier
Montana law the juvenile court dealt with youthful offenders in an
informal manner. 3 It was generally assumed that the juvenile court
judge, the juvenile probation officer, and the parents of the youth
acted in his behalf, 4 so that legal counsel could not be necessary and
might even serve to disrupt the rehabilitative atmosphere of the
proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court, however, in the now famous
decision of In re Gault, rejected the argument that a child did not
need the aid of counsel in a delinquency proceeding which "may
result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's free-
dom is curtailed, . .. " The court held that due process protections
applied in juvenile proceedings:
• ..the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right
to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are un-
1. State v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 262 P. 168, 170-171 (1927).
2. REviSED CODES OF MONTANA, §§ 10-1201 through 10-1252 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
R.C.M. 1947].
3. R.C.M. (1947) § 10-611 (Repealed July 1, 1974) provided that "the court may con-
duct the hearing in an informal manner and may adjourn the hearing from time to time."
4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35 (1967).
5. Id. at 41.
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able to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent
the child.6
Montana, in its Youth Court Act, has provided that a youth
may be represented by counsel in all stages of the proceedings.7
Because of the recent changes in statutory juvenile law and the
selective application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Gault and its progeny, many attorneys in Montana
are certain to find that they are representing youth with greater
frequency than in past years. It is essential for these attorneys to
understand the nature of the Youth Court, the intricacies of the
Youth Court Act, and the working of agencies which serve the court.
At the outset it must be noted that while the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility declares that a lawyer should represent his
client zealously, zealous adversarial representation may not always
be to the youth's advantage. Adversary representation of a juvenile
is often in conflict with the informal, rehabilitative nature of the
Youth Court. To effectively represent his client, a lawyer must often
act as an advisor or social counselor, subordinating advocacy to the
"best interests" of the child.
The attorney who best represents a youth will recognize that he
is often the only person the child trusts. Parents, the probation
officer, and the judge may all oppose what the child wants. To be
most effective, the lawyer should first listen to the youth and pro-
vide friendly counsel. He should then consider dispositional alterna-
tives and work with the judge, the probation officer, schools and
social agencies to obtain the best possible results. When it appears
that no satisfactory result can be obtained and the child opposses
the petition of delinquency and the possible institutionalization
which may result upon adjudication of that petition, the previously
subordinated role of advocate must surface to ensure that every
protection be provided for the youthful client.
Because conflicts of interest may arise, counsel must maintain
the interest of the child above all other obligations. In cases where
the parents have employed counsel to express desires which are
contrary to the best interests of their child, it is the duty of counsel
to inform the court of the conflict and request a guardian ad litem
be appointed for the child." The role of counsel can best be shown
by discussing separately each stage of the proceedings in the Youth
Court.
6. Id.
7. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(3).
8. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(4).
[Vol. 36226
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PRELIMINARY PROCEDURES
Preliminary procedure, often referred to as pre-adjudication,
includes all stages of the proceedings from the time the child is first
brought into the system until an adjudication upon a filed petition
has begun.
Youth Court Jurisdiction
Under the Youth Court Act the Youth Court has jurisdiction
over a juvenile whenever it appears that he may be a delinquent
youth, a youth in need of supervision or a youth in need of care.'
These terms are defined by the Youth Court Act as follows:
delinquent youth-one who has committed an offense which, if
committed by an adult, would consitute a criminal offense or who
violates any condition of his probation.1"
Youth in Need of Supervision-one who
(a) violates any Montana municipal or state law regarding use of
alcoholic beverages by minors: or
(b) habitually disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his
parents or guardian, or is ungovernable and beyond their control;
or
(c) being subject to compulsory school attendance is habitually
truant from school; or
(d) has committed any of the acts of a delinquent youth but who
the court in its discretion chooses to regard as a youth in need of
supervision."
Youth in Need of Care-a youth who is dependent or is suffering
from abuse or neglect. 2
Although the Youth Court has jurisdiction over youth in need of
care, provisions for dealing with such cases are not within the Youth
Court Act and are therefore not discussed in this comment.
The Youth Court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all pro-
ceedings over youth alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervi-
sion. '3 The court also has concurrent jurisdiction with justice, mu-
nicipal and police courts, over traffic and fish and game violations
committed by children. The Youth Court, however, has exclusive
jurisdiction over three traffic offenses; driving while intoxicated,
failing to stop at an accident, and repeated violations for driving
without a valid license."
9. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1206(1).
10. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1203(12).
11. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1203(13).
12. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1301(4).
13. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1206(2).
14. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1206(2).
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Custody
"Custody" is the term used to describe the process by which
juveniles are physically brought into the control of the Youth Court.
A youth may be taken into custody by a law enforcement officer
when so ordered by any court, or by a law enforcement officer pur-
suant to a lawful arrest for violation of the law. 5 The Youth Court
Act makes no provision for a citizen's arrest of a juvenile. As a
result, it is questionable that any private citizen may detain a juve-
nile for violation of any law without being subject to criminal liabil-
ity for unlawful detention and civil liability for false imprisonment.
The Youth Court Act states that custody "is not arrest except for
the purpose of determining the validity of the taking under the
constitution of Montana or the United States."'"
When a policeman takes a child into custody upon belief of
delinquent behavior, there are several dispositions available to the
police ranging from outright release to referral to the juvenile
court. 7 In Montana, the officer may release the youth into the cus-
tody of an adult upon a written promise or other assurance from the
person that he will bring the youth before the probation officer."
The youth should be detained for a period of time only when the
police officer determines that detention is necessary, when the prop-
erty or person of the youth or another is endangered, when the youth
may abscond or be removed from the jurisdiction of the court, when
he has no parent, guardian, or other person able to care for him and
return him to the court, or when the court has ordered his deten-
tion. 9
Only rarely will an attorney be present to represent the youth
when the police officer makes his determination, but if counsel is
present, he should force the officer to consider whether there is a
basis to detain the youth. When the police officer has determined
to hold the youth, he is required to immediately notify the probation
officer of the youth's apprehension and detention and must provide
a written report to the probation officer as soon as practicable. 0
Under Montana law, counsel must be involved and parents
notified only when a petition or other proceeding has been initiated.
However, there is no stated requirement that anyone notify the
parents or counsel merely that the child is being detained, since
15. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1211(1).
16. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1211(2).
17. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 12 (1967).
18. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1213(1).
19. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1212.
20. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1212(2).
[Vol. 36
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detention alone is not a "proceeding". Further, while the police
officer must determine that there is no parent or guardian capable
of custody of the child, he is not obliged to contact the parents or
guardian to do so. Therefore, because a petition need not be filed
until the youth has spent five working days in custody," it is con-
ceivable that the child could be held for such a period without
anyone being notified, and without talking to anyone about his case.
Of course, he may request a detention hearing by filing a petition
with the court," but it is not likely that a juvenile would be aware
of his right to a hearing nor is it probable that he could write to or
obtain access to the court without police or juvenile probation coop-
eration.
Counsel may be present at all stages of the proceedings and
the youth must be notified of his right to counsel when he is brought
into custody.24 But, as previously noted, being held in jail is not a
stage of the proceedings. The Youth Court Act may well be constitu-
tionally deficient because it fails to provide notice of detention to
the parents, because it does not require that the youth be provided
opportunity for counsel when first taken into custody, and because
it does not require a detention hearing before a judge. Other states
require that a youth be given a detention hearing 24 to 36 hours after
the child enters custody.25 If an attorney is appointed to represent a
child after he has spent several days in jail, without a hearing,
counsel, or notice to his parents, counsel should seek the youth's
release and dismissal of the charges for denial of the youth's civil
rights.
Detention Hearing
If the probation officer refuses to release the youth, the attorney
should petition the youth court for a detention hearing26 and at-
21. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1209(6) provides that a youth must be released from custody if
no petition is filed within five working days from date of initial confinement unless good cause
can be shown to detain the youth.
22. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1216(5) allows the youth, his parents or guardian or his counsel
to petition for a hearing to determine if custody is necessary and what form the custody should
take.
23. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(3).
24. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1209(4)(a) provides that the probation officer shall advise the
youth of his rights.
25. For example, Oregon law requires that "no child shall be held in detention more
than 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and judicial holidays, except on order of the
court made pursuant to a hearing on the matter of detention." OREGON REVISED STATUTES
419.577(3) (1974). Illinois requires that a youth detained must be brought before a judicial
officer within 36 hours, exclusive of Sundays and legal holidays, for a detention hearing.
ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, ch. 37 § 703-5 (1961).
26. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1216(5).
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tempt to persuade the judge to release the child. A detention hear-
ing is the juvenile equivalent to a preliminary hearing in adult crim-
inal cases.
In order to detain a child it must be determined that: 1 there
is probable cause to believe that the youth committed the act in
question; and 2 that the youth must be detained. 2 Although no
specific criteria for detention by the court are listed in the Youth
Court Act, the criteria upon which the judge rules should logically
be the same as those made by the probation officer: protection of
person and property, possible removal of the youth from the juris-
diction, or the absence of adult supervision and care.
In countering detention, the attorney may argue that it is con-
trary to the intent of the Act that a child be detained in jail. 21
Montana law permits a youth to be detained in an adult jail only
when there are no other facilities present, 29 but many jurisdictions
in the state have no alternative but to hold the child in a jail cell.
It may be a persuasive argument that to detain a child, especially
a young and impressionable child, in an adult jail, even though he
is separated from adults, does not promote the wholesome mental
and physical development of the child. Additional arguments may
include the following: (1) the youth would miss vital school or work
time if not released; (2) the juvenile's life will be disrupted if he is
incarcerated; (3) an adult charged with the same offense would
probably be released on a modest bond or his own recognizance; (4)
the juvenile will be forced to associate with other detained juveniles
who may be dangerous or who may teach the youth criminal behav-
ior; (5) the youth, being of slight build and younger than most
detained juveniles, may be forced to submit to deviate sexual as-
saults; (6) the ability of the juvenile to participate in the prepara-
tion of his defense is severely curtailed.3 0
Bail
If the court refuses to release the youth, the attorney may peti-
tion the court to set bail for the juvenile. There is no mention of bail
for a juvenile in the Youth Court Act, and the United States Su-
preme Court has not ruled on the issue of the right to bail for a
27. R. STE1GMANN, ILLINOIS JUVENILE PRAcicE, 3-14 (Illinois Institute for Continuing
Legal Education: 1971).
28. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1202(1) declares that one express legislative purpose of the Mon-
tana Youth Court Act is "to provide for the care, protection and wholesome mental and
physical development of a youth ... "
29. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1214(1)(e).
30. R. STIG MANN, supra note 27 at 3-17, citing R. BoucHns AND J. GOLDFARB, CALIFORNIA
JUVENILE COURT PRAcrc, 54 (California Continuing Education of the Bar: 1968).
[Vol. 36
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juvenile .3 However, an argument for bail can certainly be ccn-
structed from the following constitutional provisions. First, the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"excessive bail shall not be required." Additionally, the 1972 Mon-
tana Constitution provides in Article II, section 15, that:
The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall include, but not
be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of
such persons.
There is no statute in the Montana Youth Court Act which specifi-
cally precludes bail or which enhances the protection of a youth to
meet this constitutional mandate. Further, Article II, section 21, of
the 1972 Montana Constitution states that:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capi-
tal offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.
It must be noted that it may not always be desirable to force
the issue of bail. Where the youth may be transferred to adult court
or may well be found delinquent and be institutionalized, it is often
better to have the juvenile remain in jail for a few days than to
jeopardize negotiations where a nonjudicial consent agreement can
be obtained.
Habeas Corpus
If the judge refuses to release the youth or set bail, then the
attorney may consider the civil remedy of Habeas Corpus. The
Youth Court Act provides that "all .. .remedies available to an
adult in a criminal proceeding under the Montana Code of Criminal
Procedure shall be available to a youth proceeding under this act. '32
Habeas Corpus is therefore available, and would be a proper remedy
to question the detention. Again, it must be cautioned that the
informal, conciliatory, rehabilitative nature of the Youth Court may
be disrupted if Habeas Corpus is sought. It may be better for the
youth to spend some time in jail rather than destroy a chance for
an informal agreement by seeking to override the court.
Venue Transfer
Where a youth is detained in one place and he resides in an-
31. Because juvenile proceedings are civil rather than criminal, the United States Su-
preme Court has only selectively applied due process standards. The Court may not make
bail mandatory in juvenile proceedings. A stronger argument can be made for bail based upon
the 1972 Montana Constitution.
32. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(7).
1975]
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other, the locality in which he resides has "initial jurisdiction. '3
The meaning of this statutory pronouncement is unclear, but the
Youth Court Act provides that transfers of venue may be made to
the county where the youth is apprehended, where he allegedly
violated the law, or where his parents or guardian reside, whenever
the Youth Court judges of both jurisdictions agree.34
But there is no provision for determining which jurisdiction will
prevail when the judges do not agree. For example, a youth over the
age of sixteen may commit a homicide in W county, be apprehended
in X county, reside in Y county, and have parents or guardians in
Z county. If county W wants to prosecute the youth for deliberate
homicide after transferring him to adult court, and counties Y and
Z want him returned to those respective counties for rehabilitation,
the Act provides no priority system upon which county X can rely
to determine where the child should be sent, or whether he should
remain in X county. It may be argued by counsel for the youth that
since the county of residence, Y county, has initial jurisdiction, it
should have priority over the youth.
Informal Agreements Made by the Probation Officer
Whenever the court has been notified that a youth appears to
be delinquent or in need of supervision, the probation officer must
conduct a preliminary inquiry. If he determines that the youth
needs some attention he must either: (1) provide counseling, refer
the youth and parents to another agency, or take other informal
action not amounting to probation or detention; (2) provide for
treatment or probation agreed upon by the youth and his parents
or guardian through a "consent adjustment without petition"; or (3)
refer the matter to the county attorney for the filing of a petition
alleging that the youth is delinquent or in need of superivision.35
The purpose of an informal agreement is to avoid the trauma
and stigma of the formal determination that the child is delinquent
or in need of supervision. It allows the parties involved to obtain
dispositional alternatives not generally available to the Youth
Court, and it also avoids the negative self-image that a child will
often have after formal adjudication-the fear of being treated as a
delinquent by family, neighbors, peers, and teachers.
Counseling or Referral to Another Agency
The probation officer may feel that it is in the best interest of
33. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1207(1).
34. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1207(2).
35. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1209(5)(a),(b) and (c).
[Vol. 36
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the youth to obtain aid from another source. If the primary problem
is truancy, the school counselor or a special education teacher may
be the person to whom the youth is referred.
If the probation officer feels that probation is appropriate, he
may impose it only with the consent adjustment without petition
or upon an adjudication of a petition alleging delinquency or need
of supervision. No probation may be imposed unilaterally by the
probation officer.
An example of a beneficial referral is the case of a 14 year old
boy who has serious emotional problems, has a record of truancy,
and has run away from two private boys' homes on several occa-
sions. He was two years behind in school and was "placed" in a class
beyond his abilities. Because he had run away several times on
previous placements and had recently been involved in some larcen-
ous acts, the probation department was considering his placement
in a detention facility. The boy's mother and new step-father ob-
jected to any placement and wanted to try him at home once more.
A new special education program for junior high age students with
reading disabilities was located. With the encouragement of the
court, the boy was kept home and referred to the special education
agency. Reports on the boy over the past six months have been
favorable. Since he is responding to concentrated help in school, he
is not having serious problems at home or in public.
Consent Adjustment Without Petition
The Montana Youth Court Act provides that a written agree-
ment between the probation officer, the youth, and his parents or
guardian may be made in order to avoid formal adjudication and
to provide probation, placement in a foster home, placement in a
district youth guidance home or other teen home or half-way house,
or transfer to the department of institutions for placement in a state
facility other than a detention facility. If the complaint alleges that
a felony has been committed or if the youth has been or will be
detained, the Youth Court judge must also agree to the consent
adjustment."
A consent adjustment has one peculiarity beneficial to the
child: no statement by the youth to a probation officer or another
person who is counseling or giving advice to the youth pursuant to
a consent adjustment may be used against the youth in the Youth
Court or in any criminal proceeding. 37 For example, a 17 year old
youth and his parents sign a consent adjustment with the probation
36. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1210(2)(b).
37. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1210(3).
1975]
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officer, stating that the youth is to be on probation for a given period
of time and is to report to and be counseled by the probation officer
for the admitted act of misdemeanor theft. In a subsequent meeting,
the youth confides to the probation officer that he took the item onto
a mountain with a friend, quarreled with the friend, stabbed him
to death, and buried him on the mountain. The statements by the
youth are privileged communications and may not be used to sub-
stantiate delinquency in the Youth Court or to prosecute the youth
for homicide or any other crime in adult court. While this example
may be extreme, the purpose of the provision is to protect a youth
who confides in his counselor for the purpose of rehabilitation and
to allow juvenile probation officers to assure the youth that they will
be acting to help him, not to turn him over to the authorities for his
prior conduct. Without this provision, juvenile probation officers
would be less effective as counselors.
Consent Decree
A consent adjustment as described above must be made prior
to the filing of a petition. Once a petition has been filed, the counsel
for a youth can seek to procure a similar informal agreement, called
a "consent decree." At any time after the filing of a petition and
before entry of a judgment, the court may suspend the proceedings
and place the youth under supervision, upon terms and conditions
negotiated by the same parties required for a consent adjustment. 38
The dispositional alternatives for a consent decree are identical to
those allowable under the consent adjustment. The youth may not
be placed in a detention facility under either a consent decree or
consent adjustment. However, while similar to a consent adjust-
ment, the effect of a consent decree differs substantially.
With a consent decree, the proceedings are only suspended,
while in a consent adjustment they are terminated. If the child who
obtains a consent adjustment gets into further trouble, the new
trouble may warrant the filing of a petition against him, but should
not provoke prosecution on the original offense. By contrast, how-
ever, if a child who has agreed to a consent decree gets into further
trouble, the prosecution of his original offense may be re-initiated
in the Youth Court upon a petition or a transfer hearing. Another
disadvantage to the consent decree is that it does not protect the
youth from any incriminating statements made during counseling
whereas the consent adjustment provides such protection.
Counsel for a youth should make every attempt to obtain a
consent adjustment and should dissuade the county attorney from
38. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1224.
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filing a petition whenever possible. If the petition has been filed it
still may be to the youth's advantage to obtain a consent decree,
especially if it is possible that he would be transferred into adult
court. A consent decree does give the youth another chance, avoids
a formal record, and avoids the immediate possibility of being sent
to a detention facility.
ADJUDICATION, OR JUDGMENT ON A PETITION
The Petition
If the juvenile probation officer feels that formal action against
a youth is warranted, he must refer the case to the country attorney
for filing a petition alleging that the youth is delinquent or in need
of supervision.3 In some states, anyone may file a petition against
a juvenile,40 but in Montana only the county attorney may file a
petition in Youth Court.
A petition must state the names of the youth and his parents
or guardian, the facts of jurisdiction, the facts of the offense alleged,
and other facts required by the Youth Court Act."
The Adjudicatory Hearing
If no informal disposition can be obtained from the country
attorney or juvenile probation officer, and the petition has not been
withdrawn, the youth will be brought before the court for an adjudi-
catory hearing. An adjudicatory hearing is a fact-finding judicial
appearance by the youth and his counsel, the juvenile probation
officer, county attorney, and witnesses.
The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the youth
did in fact commit the acts alleged in the petition. Under earlier
law, the adjudicatory hearing was held informally and could be
adjourned by the court from time to time." In 1967, however, the
United States Supreme Court, in Gault, held that a youth was
entitled to certain minimal due process rights when he is charged
with being a delinquent and may be institutionalized for his alleged
act.' 3 With the inclusion of due process rights came a degree of
39. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1209(5)(c).
40. Petitions may be filed by anyone in: Oregon, OREGON REVISED STATUTES 419.482(1)
(1974); Washington, REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON ANNOTATED 13.04.060 (1961); Illinois,
ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES ch. 37 § 704-1 (1961); and Minnesota, MINNESOTA STATUTES
ANNOTATED 1947, § 260.131; for example.
41. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1215 also requires the name of the offense, birthdate and resi-
dence address of the youth, residence addresses of parents, whether youth is in custody, a
list of witnesses, and the statute rule, regulation, or provision of law which the youth allegedly
violated.
42. See explanation, supra note 3.
43. In re Gault, supra note 4.
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formality in the juvenile system not unlike adult criminal proceed-
ings. The United States Supreme Court does not require that the
juvenile court conform with all of the requisites of a criminal trial,
but only with the essentials of due process and fair treatment."
Enumeration and discussion of these requirements will follow.
Bifurcation or Separation of the Adjudicatory and Dispositional
Stages
Under the early juvenile codes, courts did not always distin-
guish between the fact-finding and the dispositional stages of the
hearing. The essential question was not whether the child was
guilty, but rather whether he could be helped. No specific charges
were required to be brought; a course of conduct might have been
considered sufficient to warrant the determination of delinquency.
To alleviate the failure by juvenile courts to differentiate clearly
between the adjuciatory hearing, held to determine the truth of the
allegations in the petition, and the disposition proceeding, when the
juvenile's background is considered to decide what to do with him
the President's Commission on Law Envorcement and Administra-
tion of Justice recommended that:
Juvenile court hearings be divided into an adjudicatory hearing
and a dispositional one, and the evidence admissible at the adjudi-
catory hearing should be so limited that findings are not dependent
upon or unduly influenced by hearsay, gossip, rumor, and other
unreliable types of information."5
Montana has provided a bifurcated hearing process. The adju-
dicatory hearing is held to determine whether the contested offenses
are supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." After the youth
has been found to be delinquent or in need of supervision, a disposi-
tional hearing is held to determine which rehabilitative program
would be best suited to the youth's needs. 7
In the adjudicatory hearing, the attorney representing a youth
must become an advocate for the child. The Gault case provided
certain due process protections which must be present in every adju-
dicatory hearing. To best represent his client, the attorney should
know which rights are available in a juvenile proceeding.
44. In the Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969).
45. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDr's COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUsTIcE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 87 (1967).
46. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1220.
47. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1221.
[Vol. 36
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Notice of the Charges
"Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be
given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so tha-
treasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded, and it must 'set
forth the alleged misconduct with particularity.' "48 Montana pro-
vides that a summons be served upon the youth, and upon his
parents, guardian, or custodian having actual custody of the
youth." The summons must be served at least five days before the
stated appearance. 0 There is little question therefore that Mon-
tana's notice provisions satisfy constitutional due process require-
ments.
Right to Counsel
Where a youth is charged with being delinquent, and may be
committed to an institution as a result of adjudication, "the child
and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be repre-
sented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford
counsel, that counsel be appointed to represent them."'" Whenever
a youth is taken into custody in Montana, he must be immediately
and effectively advised of his right to counsel.5" If the youth is under
twelve years old, his parents may effectively waive his right to coun-
sel.53 Where the interests of the parents conflict with those of the
youth, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the
interests of the child. 4 Counsel appointed to represent the youth
could also be designated as guardian ad litem. Wherever the child
is separated from his parents, it should be presumed that the par-
ents who waive his right to counsel are acting contrary to the best
interests of the youth, and a guardian ad litem and counsel should
be appointed to represent the child.
When the child is over twelve, he and his parents may agree to
waive counsel. If he wants counsel and his parents do not, counsel
will be appointed for him. If he wants to refuse counsel, contrary to
his parents' desires, he may do so only after conferring with an
attorney.55
48. In re Gault, supra note 4 at 33.
49. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1216.
50. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1217(1).
51. In re Gault, supra note 4 at 41.
52. See discussion, supra note 24.
53. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(1)(b)(i), provides for parental waiver, but it is questionable
whether waiver by the parents should ever be allowed where the freedom of the youth is at
stake.
54. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(4).
55. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(1)(b)(iii).
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In addition:
Neither the youth nor his parents or guardian may waive
counsel if commitment to a detention facility or youth forest camp
or to the department of institutions for a period of more than six
(6) months may result from adjudication."
This protective provision is one of the most important ones in the
Youth Court Act. Because a youth may be declared delinquent for
the commission of any offense which would be a criminal offense if
committed by an adult,57 and may be placed in a detention facility
if declared delinquent," no youth who allegedly committed a crimi-
nal offense may waive counsel. A youth must be immediately and
effectively advised of his constitutional rights upon being taken into
custody. In any circumstance where a criminal act is alleged or
suspected to have been committed by the youth, he must be advised
of his right to counsel and he cannot waive his right to counsel; and
any statement made without the presence of counsel is inadmissi-
ble.
Self-Incrimination
The Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is appl-
icable to juveniles as well as to adults. Montana has provided that
in a delinquency adjudication, no statement inadmissible in adult
criminal court will be admitted as evidence in the Youth Court. As
was discussed in the section on right to counsel, a youth may not
waive counsel for any allegedly delinquent act in Montana. An ex-
trajudicial confession or admission made without presence of coun-
sel could be attacked in two ways: first, the right to counsel cannot
be waived, so the statement made without counsel is inadmissible;
secondly, even if a child could waive counsel, any waiver of a right
must be a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right. Whenever
an admission has been obtained without thepresence of counsel, it
must be shown with certainty to have been voluntary, not coerced
or suggested or" . . the product of ignorance of rights or of adoles-
cent fantasy, fright or despair." 0
It should be noted that the Montana statute provides protec-
56. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(3). A detention facility is defined in R.C.M. 1947, § 10-
1203(17) and presently includes Pine Hills School in Miles City and Mountain View School
in Helena.
57. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1204(12)(a).
58. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1222(1)(d) only states that a youth declared in need of supervi-
sion may not be placed in a detention facility. By negative implication, a delinquent youth
may be placed in a detention facility.
59. In re Gault, supra note 4 at 55.
60. Id.
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tion only for a youth alleged to be delinquent. Perhaps it was felt
that a youth in need of supervision need not be provided the same
protection concerning self-incriminating matter, although such a
distinction does not appear to be logically supportable. Not with-
standing this distinction in the statutes, counsel should still be able
to rely upon the fact that the United States Supreme Court did not
qualify or limit the privilege against self-incrimination to those cir-
cumstances where the youth may be incarcerated. Nor is the privi-
lege limited to criminal cases, but may be claimed in civil proceed-
ings where no institutionalization or criminal penalty could result.'
Even though juvenile proceedings are civil rather than criminal, and
although a need of supervision decree does not have the severe con-
sequences of detention which are possible in a delinquency determi-
nation, the youth has a right not to incriminate himself.
Confrontation and Cross-examination of Witnesses
The determination of delinquency and subsequent commit-
ment to an institution may not be sustained unless any sworn testi-
mony is subject to cross-examination and confrontation.62
Montana has provided that a youth may confront his accusers
in any proceeding on a petition, whether he is charged with being
delinquent or in need of supervision . 3
Admissibility of Evidence
The United States Supreme Court limited itself in Gault to the
adjudicatory stage of the juvenile proceedings and did not address
itself to other stages of the proceedings. Evidentiary matters which
occur during the pre-adjudicative stages of the juvenile proceedings
have not been tested before the highest court. For example, a
youth's right against unreasonable search and seizure has not been
constitutionally settled. In Montana, however, the legislature has
provided that no evidence illegally seized will be admissible in a
juvenile proceeding where delinquency is alleged. 4
Burden of Proof
Because juvenile proceedings are generally considered to be
civil, rather than criminal, in nature, the burden of proof formerly
required to be carried by the state was a preponderance of the evi-
dence. In 1970, however, the United States Supreme Court declared
61. Id. at 49.
62. Id. at 57.
63. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(5).
64. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(I)(c)(ii).
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that whenever a juvenile has allegedly committed an act which
would be a criminal offense if charged against an adult and the
youth may be judged delinquent as a consequence, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt must be established by the state. 5 The Youth
Court Act requires that proof beyond a reasonable doubt be estab-
lished in delinquency and in need of supervision judgments.6
Jury Trial
A jury trial in state juvenile delinquency proceedings is not
required under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 7 A youth may demand a jury trial in Montana, but if he fails
to do so, his right to it is waived 8
Other Rights
Many of the details of procedure in the juvenile court adjudica-
tory process are presently in a state of flux. Some rights which must
be provided to adults are also available to juveniles, while other
rights are not. Montana has attempted to give youths the right to
many adult criminal protections. The adjudicatory hearing must be
recorded verbatim to provide a proper basis for appeal." Whenever
an adjudicatory hearing is ordered, it must be given preferential
priority over other matters before the court.70 Additionally, the peti-
tion hearing must begin within fifteen days after service to neces-
sary parties or be dismissed with prejudice, ensuring a speedy trial
to the accused youth.7 Once a youth has been discharged from
probation or has successfully complied with the terms of the disposi-
tion of a petition, he cannot be proceeded against in any court again
for the same offense.72 The youth may appeal to the Supreme Court
of Montana from any judgment in the Youth Court, and may be
given a stay of execution upon the judgment if provisions for custody
and care of the youth are made pending hearing of the appeal. 3
The youth does not, however, have the right to a public trial.
The general public is excluded from all proceedings on a petition
unless the petition alleges that a felony has been committed. When
65. In the Matter of Winship, supra note 44.
66. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1220(4).
67. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1970).
68. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1220(1).
69. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1220(3).
70. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1220(1).
71. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1219.
72. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1224(4). Although this double jeopardy protection is stated in the
"consent decree with petition" statute, it should be applicable whenever probation or supervi-
sion has been satisfactorily completed. It is unfortunate that the provision was so placed.
73. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1225(1) and (2).
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a felony is alleged, persons with a legitimate interest, including
radio, television and newspaper reporters, must be allowed to be
present." It is possible that counsel for a youth may desire that the
proceedings be made public. Where it appears that the youth is not
being treated fairly by the court, counsel could seek to make the
court respond to public pressure by demanding that the proceedings
be made public. Privacy in the Youth Court is grounded upon the
presumption that the court is there to rehabilitate, not punish, the
child. It may be that it is unconstitutional to deny a child the right
to a public trial upon his request based upon the youth's assertion
that the public would be repulsed by the harshness of treatment in
the court.
THE DISPOSITIONAL PROCESS
The dispositional hearing has been separated from the adjudi-
catory stage of the proceedings. It is essential that the finding of
delinquency or need of supervision be based solely upon proof of the
child's actions, not upon the social history or rehabilitative needs
of the child. For this reason, the matters which may be brought
before the court differ substantially in the two hearings.
In the adjudicatory hearing, only matters relevant and compe-
tent to the issue of culpability may be introduced; in the disposi-
tional hearing, however, any matter which sheds light upon the
needs of the child is proper. Montana law provides that a social
summary be submitted to the court by the probation officer in writ-
ing before the dispositional hearing is held. 5
If the youth admits guilt, the dispositional hearing may be held
immediately after he has admitted to the court that the offenses
alleged in the petition are true. In these circumstances, counsel
should request that the social history be made prior to the adjudica-
tory hearing in order to allow the youth to begin the rehabilitative
program as soon as possible.
Where the youth denies the allegations in the petition, no social
history should be allowed until the judgment on the petition has
been entered."6 Postponing the social summary helps to ensure that
the judgment on the petition will not be colored by the "rehabilita-
tive needs" of the youth.
Montana law requires that defense counsel be given a copy of
the social summary." To be effective during the dispositional hear-
74. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1220(5).
75. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1221(2).
76. H. JOHNSON, JR., JuviLE LAw HANDBOOK, § 6.4 (Oregon Achievement in Continu-
ing Legal Education: 1970).
77. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1221(3).
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ing, counsel should ascertain the accuracy of the reports and be able
to provide alternatives to the disposition proposed in the summary
report.
The probation officer who filed the social summary, and anyone
else who prepared any portion of the social summary, may be sub-
poenaed by the youth, his parents, guardian, or counsel.18 The au-
thor of each report may be cross-examined concerning the content
of the report and conclusions submitted by that person. Counsel
should question the probation officer or other officials to determine
if they have made any oral comments or recommendations to the
judge. Statements not in the report may have a substantial effect
upon the judge and cannot be questioned unless the attorney is
aware of them.
When the social summary and the recommendations of the
probation officer are contrary to the realistic desires of the client,
counsel for the youth should try to counterbalance the substantial
influence a probation officer often has upon the judge. In making a
dispositional plea, the attorney should consider filing affidavits in
mitigation of the child's actions or in support of action sought by
the child. "Such affidavits would ordinarily be obtained from an
employer of the child, friends, relatives, . the child's physician,
psychologist or psychiatrist, . . .
In addition to affidavits, counsel may request an independent
social history or psychological examination of the child. Expert tes-
timony and advice may also prove to be an important factor in the
dispositional determination by the judge.
All alternative dispositions should be considered. It is possible
that the court would consider the placement of the child with
friends or relatives of the family who can provide a stable supervised
environment. Judges often agree that a youth who has been mislead
by companions would benefit most by a change of surroundings.
Placement in district youth guidance homes throughout the
state should be sought. These youth homes often have room for a
few youths from other districts. Aftercare, an agency within the
Department of Institutions, may also be contacted to make a place-
ment.
The dispositional hearing is to be recorded verbatim and is not
open to the public unless a felony has been alleged, as is the case in
the adjudicatory hearing.
Although the Montana legislature has statutorily required that
supervision, care, and rehabilitation be provided to the youthful
78. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1221(2).
79. H. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 77 at § 6.8.
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offender, 0 facilities and programs which aid in the rehabilitative
process have not been expanded to meet these goals. It is often true
that the only realistic choices available are outright dismissal,
probation under loose and infrequent supervision, or commitment
to the state reform school.8 ' Even though some district youth guid-
ance homes and other "teen homes" are presently operational,
placement in a juvenile facility is often difficult to obtain for a
youth, and usually requires a significant amount of preparation by
the defense counsel.
In those situations where no placement is available, the youth
may well be faced with the likelihood of institutionalization in a
detention facility. Although it is beyond the scope of this comment,
counsel should be aware that there are several recent federal court
decisions which have recognized a constitutional right to treatment
for institutionalized juveniles." Where the state institutionalizes a
person on the theory of rehabilitation, without observing the due
process protections of the criminal system, confinement of that per-
son is a violation of due process if no treatment is forthcoming. 3
PROBATION REvIEW AND REvOCATION
Probation is the most frequently used method of rehabilitation;
it provides the youth another chance and allows him to remain in a
family environment in most cases.8" In many cases, the youth re-
sponds well to probation and manages to stay out of trouble. In
those situations where the youth violates the conditions of probation
or engages in further unlawful acts, the Youth Court may respond
with more structured rehabilitation. Counsel should be aware that
the process of probation review and revocation is different under
each type of probationary agreement.
The Montana statute authorizing a consent adjustment with-
out petition makes no provision for revocation of probation. When
a youth violates his probation, a petition may be filed upon the act
which constituted a breach of a probationary condition if that
breach will independently support a petition. It is questionable
whether a petition may be initiated for acts upon which the consent
80. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1212(2).
81. S. Fox, THE LAW OF JUVENIE CoURTS IN A NUTSHELL, 203 (1971).
82. Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Nelson v. Hayne, 355 F.
Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (C.D.N.Y. 1972).
83. Note, Judicial Recognition and Implementation of a Right to Treatment for Institu-
tionalized Juveniles, 49 NOTRE DAME LAwYER 1051 (1974); Recent Developments, Limits on
Punishment and Entitlement to Rehabilitative Treatment of Institutionalized Juveniles:
Nelson v. Hayne, 60 VIRoiCA LAw REVIEw 864 (1974).
84. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1202(3) provides that rehabilitation be achieved in a family
environment whenever possible.
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adjustment is based.
It is also unclear whether the youth's signature on the consent
adjustment constitutes an admission to the "admitted facts which
bring the case within the jurisdiction of the court."85 No statement
by the youth to a juvenile probation officer or other counselor during
a conference incident to the consent adjustment may be used
against the youth."8 However, this privileged communication might
not be extended to cover the "admitted facts" in the consent adjust-
ment.
In order to minimize thepossibility of a petition upon violation
of probation, counsel should attempt to limit the admitted facts in
the consent adjustment to include only a statement that the youth
admits he has acted in an unlawful manner which brings him within
the jurisdiction of the court.8
Provisions for violation of probation have been made in cases
where the youth is subject to a consent decree. When the youth fails
to comply with a probationary condition, the original petition may
be reinstated and the proceedings on it continued to the conclusion
of the case. 8
When a youth violates a probationary condition upon a formal
decree of delinquency or need of supervision, petition to revoke pro-
bation may be filed. The petition must contain the same informa-
tion and be screened in the same manner as petitions alleging delin-
quency or need of supervision. The petition to revoke probation
should state the terms of probation violated and the alleged facts
which support the violation. The youth is not entitled to a jury, and
the standard of proof is the same standard used in the probation
revocation of an adult. 9
The Montana statute provides that the court may make any
judgment of disposition it could have made in the original case."
Evidently, a youth in need of supervision who violates a condition
of probation may not be sent to a detention facility because he could
not have been sent there under the original judgment. In order to
be sent to a detention facility, the county attorney would have to
file a delinquency petition alleging the violation of a probationary
condition." The youth would be entitled to a jury and the state
85. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1210(l)(a).
86. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1210(3).
87. A statement to this effect would comply with R.C.M. 1947 § 10-1210(l)(a).
88. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1224(3).
89. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1228. The standard of proof is the same in juvenile probation
revocation as it is in adult probation revocation.
90. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1228.
91. To be sent to a detention facility, the youth must be declared delinquent, and the
state must comply with the standards set for a delinquency petition, See discussion, supra
note 58.
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would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the youth
breached a probationary condition.
TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT9 2
A transfer is the procedure by which a Youth Court waives its
exclusive jurisdiction over a youth in order that he may be tried as
an adult in district court for an alleged criminal offense. 3 Transfers
are made when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
youth has committed a serious crime indicating a maturity and
emotional attitude which made it very unlikely resources available
to the Youth Court would be rehabilitative. When the youth has
been transferred into district court, jurisdiction in the Youth Court
is terminated with respect to acts alleged.
A youth may be transferred into district court in Montana only
when he is sixteen years of age or older when the alleged criminal
act occurred. 4 No youth under the age of sixteen may be prosecuted
for a criminal offense in district court, nor may a juvenile over
sixteen who has not been transferred by the Youth Court. 5
Before a youth may be transferred, a petition must be filed
against the youth in the Youth Court, a motion for transfer must
be made by the county attorney, and a hearing must be held to
determine if the transfer should be made." A written notice of the
transfer hearing must be given to the youth and his parents, guard-
ian, or custodian at least ten days before the hearing is held." The
transfer hearing is to be held in conformity with the rules for an
adjudicatory delinquency hearing, except that a jury trial cannot be
demanded.
Under the Montana Youth Court Act, a transfer may be made
only when the alleged unlawful act is one of the following:
1. criminal homicide, including deliberate, mitigated deliberate,
and negligent homicide;
2. arson;
3. aggravated assault;
4. robbery;
5. burglary or aggravated burglary;
92. Transfer, or waiver of jurisdiction into adult court, was reviewed in Kent v. US.,
383 U.S. 541 (1966). In that case, the Supreme Court ordered that the transfer of a youth in
the District of Columbia comply with the requirements of notice, a hearing, and a written
finding by the judge of his reasons for waiver.
93. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229.
94. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229(1)(a).
95. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229(4).
96. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229(1).
97. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229(1)(c).
98. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229(1)(b).
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6. sexual intercourse without consent;
7. aggravated kidnapping;
8. possession of explosives or;
9. criminal sale of dangerous drugs for profit."
Before the youth may be transferred, the court must also deter-
mine that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (1) the youth
committed the act, (2) the offense was so serious that there is no
treatment for the youth obtainable by juvenile facilities which will
adequately protect the community, and (3) the alleged offense was
committed in an aggressive, violent, or premeditated amnner. °0
These three requirements are conjunctive; all of them must be met
before transfer may be allowed.
The primary issue in the transfer hearing is whether the youth
may be appropriately and effectively dealt with in the juvenile sys-
tem. No determination of guilt as to the alleged act is to be made.
If there are reasonable grounds to believe he committed the act, he
may be considered for transfer.
Technically, each enumerated offense must be committed in
either a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner before the
youthful offender will be transferred. It should be noted that such
offenses as negligent homicide and negligent arson, while the result
of a destructive or injurious force, do not involve a vehement, pas-
sionate, conscious or intentional design to destroy as required by the
statute. In charges of negligent homicide, negligent arson, sale of
dangerous drugs for profit, or sexual intercourse without consent,
where the female is more than three years younger than the juvenile,
the court will seek to determine the extent of premeditation, aggres-
sion, or force involved. Jurisdiction should be retained by the Youth
Court where it can be shown that the youth is not a threat to society
and is likely to be rehabilitated.
To effectively defend a motion to transfer a youth to district
court, counsel should attempt to show that the juvenile system has
rehabilitative resources which will aid his client. Upon the motion,
the prosecution may attempt to show that previous rehabilitative
attempts by juvenile agencies had failed.
Practice Tip: In cases where the child has previously received the
benefits of the juvenile court rehabilitatory process (such as coun-
seling, probationary supervision or incarceration in an institution)
and the social worker reasons that future attempts at rehabilita-
tion will fail because past attempts have failed, counsel may well
review the quality of services offered to the child in the past and
99. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229(1)(a)(i) through (ix).
100. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1229(1)(d).
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measure the same against the quality of services which ought to
have been prvided. This is particularly true in areas where case
workers have extremely heavy case loads, or where either time or
facilities necessary for proper treatment have been unavailable.' 0 '
Facts which would tend to shed light upon the immaturity of
the youth or the limited involvement he had in the act alleged would
decrease the likelihood of transfer.
If the Youth Court judge does not waive jurisdiction and denies
the transfer, counsel should consider disqualifying the judge in fur-
ther proceedings. 0 2 Because he has listened to the social history of
the child and other matter not relevant to the determination of
delinquency, he may be predisposed to find adversely upon the
alleged facts of the case.
The decision to transfer the youth is considered a judgment by
the Youth Court, and therefore should be appealable to the Su-
preme Court of Montana. A stay of the criminal proceedings in
district court is allowed until the appeal has been heard.
10 3
RECORDS, FINGERPRINTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Most juvenile court laws provide that youthful indiscretion will
remain a secret between the court and the juvenile offender. To
provide the best rehabilitative environment, it is essential that the
youth not be branded for life as one who has a criminal or antisocial
mentality. "This claim of secrecy, however, is more rhetoric than
reality."' Even when there are comprehensive protective statutes,
employers, governmental agencies, and the military often have ways
of procuring information from Youth Court records. On some occa-
sions, the military will refuse to accept a person or will not allow
him to enter a special training school unless it is given access to
juvenile files. Private employers word application forms so that the
prospective employee feels bound to disclose his "confidential juve-
nile records." An example of an intrusion into the private juvenile
records may be seen in the University of Montana Law School Moral
Character and Fitness Statement which asks:
Have you ever been summoned, arrested, taken into custody, in-
dicted, convicted or tried for, or charged with, or pleaded guilty to,
the violation of any law or ordinance in which the penalty was or
could be a fine or imprisonment? Include all such incidents no
matter how minor the infraction or whether guilty or not. Although
101. D. MCCOOL, JuvENIE LAW HANDBOOK, § 4.7 (Oregon Achievement in Continuing
Legal Education: 1970).
102. Disqualification is provided in R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1223.
103. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1225(1) and (2).
104. In re Gault, supra note 4 at 24.
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a conviction may have been expunged from the records by order
of court, it nevertheless must be disclosed in your answer to this
question.
Yes - No - If your answer is yes, state the crime, the court
in which you were charged, the disposition of the charge, and any
extenuating circumstances which you wish to mention.
In order to provide for the protection of the youth in the future,
counsel should review the case after the youth as completed any
dispositional judgment and has reached his eighteenth birthday.
After the youth has inspected his record, °5 counsel should seek to
have the judge expunge it. Although the Youth Court Act does not
provide for expungement prior to ten years from the date of the"
sealing of the record, some judges may be persuaded to use their
inherent equity power to ensure that the rehabilitated juvenile not
suffer additionally for his youthful indiscretion. In this way, the
youth will be able to say that he has no record and the court cannot
be pressured to expose a file which no longer exists.
An additional problem arises, however, when the youth's acts
have become general knowledge to the community. Expunction of
the Youth Court record would not eliminate the possibility that an
employer or governmental agency would obtain information from
police records or other non-judicial sources. In these cases, it is
better for the youth to acknowledge the juvenile record so that he
can establish any mitigating circumstance and a favorable dis-
charge from the supervisory status.
Montana law provides that law enforcement, 06 probation offi-
cer, and Youth Court records'07 not be disclosed to the public unless
so ordered by the Youth Court. Only legal officers, the staff of the
Youth Court, the youth, his parents, guardian, and counsel have
access to these records without obtaining an order of the court.
Counsel must be aware that many counties throughout the
state have not provided that these records and all copies of the
records be kept confidential while the person is a youth and be
sealed upon his majority. Juveniles may be booked into the jail in
the same book with adults. Police practice may list the names of all
adults and juveniles allegedly involved in a criminal incident mak-
ing no attempt to maintain the confidentiality of the youths listed.
Copies of police and probation reports may be sent to agencies,
attorneys, or other courts with no record kept of these transactions.
It is the job of the defense attorney to see that the court, the proba-
105. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1231(1)(f) allows a youth to inspect his record after it has been
sealed.
106. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1230.
107. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1232(3).
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tion officer and the police obey provisions which are intended to
keep records of the client confidential.
Montana provides that only the youth court may order finger-
printing and photographing of youths. 108 In order to ensure the pro-
tective confidentiality for his client, counsel should be certain that
these fingerprints and photographs be destroyed upon the termina-
tion of the case.109
CONCLUSION
Recent developments in juvenile law have made the defense
attorney a key figure in the Youth Court proceedings. "Counsel is
the confidant, spokesman, and protector of rights for the juve-
nile.""' The juvenile's defender should remember that he is working
for the ultimate benefit of his client. So long as the state acts in its
role as parens patriae, it is in the youth's best interest that the
attorney act as counselor and advisor, subrogating his role as an
advocate. When the state seeks to imperil the interests of the child,
or fails to act in his best interest through ignorance, incompetence,
or carelessness, the attorney must become a fierce adversary. He
must challenge the juvenile system to provide his client with the due
process protections and the rehabilitative services every youth has
the right to expect. No child deserves less.
108. R.C.M. 1947, § 10-1218(2)(a).
109. The statutes provide for destruction under R.C.M. 1947 § 10-1218(2)(c).
110. Comment, Representing the Juvenile in the Adjudicatory Hearing, 12 ST. Louis
U. L. J. 492 (1968).
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